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CASE COMMENTS

CONSTITUTIONAL
"SHIELD"

LAW

STATUTE

-

LIMITS

WITNESSES
THE

-

NORTH

NEWSGATHERER'S

DAKOTA'S
STATUTORY

PRIVILEGE IF NONDISCLOSURE WOULD CAUSE A MISCARRIAGE OF
JUSTICE

This decision' arose pursuant to two civil actions 2 brought to
determine the liability for an automobile-motorcycle accident in the
city of Grand Forks. 3 Following the accident a photographer from
the Grand Forks Herald took one or more photographs of the scene
of the mishap. 4 The Grand Forks Police Department did not take
any photographs of the accident site. 5 The parties disputed the
testimony regarding the relative positions of the vehicles involved

in the accident. 6 To resolve this issue, respondent's attorney
obtained a subpoena duces tecum ordering the chief photographer
for the Grand Forks Herald to appear at a district court hearing
and bring any and all photographs and negatives of the accident in
his possession. 7 The Grand Forks Herald then filed a motion to
quash the subpoena. 8 At the hearing on the motion to quash, the
1. Grand Forks Herald v. District Court, 322 N.W.2d 850 (N.D. 1982).
2. Id. at 851. The two underlying cases were Grunenwald v. Leng, No. 35698 (N.D. Dist. Ct.
filed Apr. 28, 1982), and Lian v. Leng, No. 35732 (N.D. Dist. Ct. filed May 13, 1982).
3. 322 N.W.2d at 851. The accident occurred on October 21, 1981, on South Washington Street
in Grand Forks at approximately 5:30 p.m. Brief of Respondent at 1, Grand Forks Herald v. District
Court, 322 N.W.2d 850 (N.D. 1982).
4. 322 N.W.2d at 851. The actual number of photographs taken by the newspaper photographer is not known. Id.
5. 322 N.W.2d at 856. A police officer with the Grand Forks Police Department stated that
officers are not required to take photographs of accident sites. To do so is at the discretion of the
individual officer at the scene. If serious personal injuries or a large amount of property damage is
involved, the police department usually takes photographs. When an accident involves a fatality, the
officer must take photographs of the accident site. The police officer must be able to justify the
request for photographs to his superior. Interview with Grand Forks police officer who prefers to
remain anonymous (Sept. 24, 1982).
6. Brief of Respondent at 3, Grand Forks Herald v. District Court, 322 N.W.2d 850 (N.D.
1982). The testimony of the two parties involved in the accident and that of the investigating police
officer about the location of the vehicles at the time of the impact conflicted. Brief of Respondent at 3.
7. Brief of Petitioners at 1, Grand Forks Herald v. District Court, 322 N.W.2d 850 (N.D.
1982).
8.322 N.W.2d at 851.
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district court ordered the newspaper to produce the photographs. 9
The Grand Forks Herald did not comply and petitioned the North
Dakota Supreme Court to issue a supervisory writ directing the
district court to vacate its order compelling disclosure of the
photographs. 10 The newspaper contended that to force it to release
the photographs would violate the first amendment to the United
States Constitution1 1 and section 31-01-06.2 of the North Dakota
Century Code. 12 The respondent claimed that to deny access to the
photographs, which she maintained contained crucial and possibly
determinative evidence, 13 would thwart justice by preventing her
from getting a full and fair trial based on the merits. 14 The North
Dakota Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in requiring the Grand Forks Herald to disclose its
photographs.1 5 GrandForks Heraldv. District Court, 322 N.W.2d 850
(N.D. 1982).
Freedom of the press is one of the basic rights included in the
first amendment to the United States Constitution.1 6 Although the
rights enumerated in the first amendment have played an integral
part in the American constitutional scheme, it was not until 1924
that the United States Supreme Court held these rights binding
upon the states 17 through the due process clause of the fourteenth
9. Id.
10. Id. at 852. The hearing on the motion to quash was held on June 19, 1982, in Grand Forks
County District Court before District Court Judge A. C. Bakken. Brief of Petitioners at 2, Grand
Forks Herald v. District Court, 322 N.W.2d 850 (N.D. 1982).
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
12. 322 N.W.2d at 853. North Dakota's "shield statute" provides:
No person shall be required in any proceeding or hearing to disclose any
information or the source of any information procured or obtained while the person
was engaged in gathering, writing, photographing, or editing news and was employed
by or acting for any organization engaged in publishing or broadcasting news, unless
directed by an order of a district court of this state which, after hearing, finds that the
failure ofdisclosure of such evidence will cause a miscarriage ofjustice.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976).
13. Brief of Respondent at 10-11, Grand Forks Herald v. District Court, 322 N.W.2d 850
(N.D. 1982). The respondent argued that juries give great weight to photographic evidence. Thus,
photographs would be of greater value to the jury in determining liability than mere oral testimony.
Brief of Respondent at 10-11.
14. Id. at 21. The respondent asserted that the court should deny petitioner's request for a
supervisory writ and affirm the order of the district court compelling disclosure. Id.
15. Grand Forks Herald v. District Court, 322 N.W.2d 850, 857 (N.D. 1982).
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. For the text of the first amendment, see supra note 11.
17. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1924). In this landmark decision the Court stated:
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress - are
among the fundamental personal rights and "liberties" protected by the due process
clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.
Id. at 666.
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amendment. 18 These rights, regarded as fundamental, 19 are not
absolute. 20 Since reaching the conclusion that first amendment
rights are not absolute, courts have clarified this position in a
number of decisions. 2 1 In Garlandv. Torre22 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit explained that newsgatherers do not have a
privilege to withhold information and thus can be forced to disclose
such information. 23 The Garlandcourt laid down several guidelines
for determining when to require a newsgatherer to disclose
information. 24 The court stated that courts could not use judicial
processes to force wholesale disclosure of a newsgatherer's
confidential sources, and the information sought must go to the
25
heart of the claim.
The leading case dealing with the newsgatherer's claimed first
amendment privilege is Branzburg v. Hayes. 26 In Branzburg the
United States Supreme Court held that requiring newsmen to
appear before grand juries did not abridge their freedoms of speech
and press guaranteed by the first amendment. 27 The Court
reiterated the common law view that newsmen do not have a
privilege to refuse to testify before a grand jury regarding
confidential information. 28 The Court emphasized that the
obligation of a citizen to testify before a grand jury or trial and give
what information he possesses eclipsed the first amendment interest
advanced by the newsgatherers. 29 The Court expressed
dissatisfaction with the newsgatherers' argument that forced
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This section provides in part: "nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw." Id.
19. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973) (fundamentil
rights defined as those "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution").
20. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931) ("Liberty of speech, and of the press, is also
not an absolute right, and the State may punish its abuse. ").
21. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (193 1) freedoms ofspeech and of the press are not
absolute); Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.) (first amendment rights are not absolute, and a
compelling interestjustifies some impairment of these rights), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
22. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.) (libel action), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
23. 259 F.2d at 550. The Garland court stated that "freedom of the press, precious and vital
though it is to a free society, is not an absolute. What must be determined is whether the interest to
be served by compelling the testimony of the witness in the present case justifies some impairment of
this First Amendment freedom." Id. at 548. The interest served was the fair administration ofjustice
by the state through its court system. Id. at 549.
24. Id. at 549-50.
25. Id. Among the other criteria that the court considered were situations in which the identity
of the news source was of dubious relevance or the information sought was not material to the
plaintiff's claim. Id.
26. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
27. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). This decision was a consolidation of three cases
in which the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The cases below were Branzburg v. Pound, 461
S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971); In Re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971); and
Caldwell v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal.), rev'd, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
28. 408 U.S. at 685.
29. Id. at 686. The Branzburg Court stated that there was no "reason to hold that these reporters,
any more than other citizens, shbuld be excused from furnishing information that may help the
grand jury in arriving at its initial determination." Id. at 702.
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disclosure would hamper the flow of news and impinge upon their
ability to perform their informational function. 30 The Court,
however, took the newsman's plight into account when it asserted
that the state must show a compelling interest to warrant even an
implicit burden on protected first amendment rights. 3 1 After stating
that a compelling state interest in the fair administration of justice
could override the newsgatherer's testimonial and source privilege,
the Court left the door open to Congress and the state legislatures to
32
change the balance statutorily if they deemed it necessary.
This invitation to the states led to the passage of "shield
statutes" 33 in many states. An example of such a statute is the
Pennsylvania law, 34 which the Court of Appeals for the Third
30. Id. at 697. The Court reasoned that judicial control of the grand jury system and the
availability of the motion to quash would sufficiently protect the constitutional rights of the
newsgatherer. Id. at 708.
31. Id. at 700. The investigation of crime by the grand jury and the resulting security of citizens
and property were the compelling interests that the Court balanced against the newsgatherer's first
amendment rights when it held that the latter must give way. Id.
32. Id. at 706. The Court stated:
At the federal level, Congress has freedom to determine whether a statutory
newsman's privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards and rules as
narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil discerned and, equally
important, to refashion those rules as experience from time to time may dictate. There
is also merit in leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment limits, to
fashion their own standards in light of the conditions and problems with respect to the
relations between law enforcement officials and press in their own areas. It goes
without saying, of course, that we are powerless to bar state courts from responding in
their own way and construing their own constitutions so as to recognize a newman's
privilege, either qualified or absolute.
Id.
33. See In re Farber, 394 A.2d 330 (N.J.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978). The New Jersey
Supreme Court defined "shield law" as "the term . . . commonly and widely applied to statutes
granting newsmen and other media representatives the privilege of declining to reveal confidential
sources of information." 394 A.2d at 335 n.2.
See also Letter from Al Austin to Howard Freed (Jan. 10, 1973) (discussing the pending North
Dakota shield legislation). Al Austin was a professor of journalism at the University of North
Dakota. In his letter he urged Senator Freed, Chairman of the SenateJudiciary Committee, to enact
the shield legislation. He stated that in light of the Branzburg decision, newsmen needed greater
statutory protection. Id.
North Dakota is not alone in its adoption of a shield statute. Other states' shield statutes are as
follows: ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1975); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150-.220 (1973); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977); CAL. EvID. CODE § 1070 (West
Supp. 1982); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 111-119
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns Supp. 1982); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 421.100 (1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45.1451-.1454 (West Supp. 1982); MD. CTS. &JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. 9 9-112 (1980); MiCH. Corep. LAws ANN.§ 767.5a (1982); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 595.021-.025 (West Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to 903 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 20-144-47 (1977); NEV. REv. STAT. § 49.275 (1981);N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to 21.9 (West
Supp. 1982-1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (Supp. 1981) (declared unconstitutional in
Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976)); N.Y. Civ.
RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1981)1982); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2739.04 (Page
1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 1980); OR. Rev. STAT. §§44.510-.540 (1981); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (Purdon 1982); R. I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-.3 (Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980).
34. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942(a) (Purdon 1982). The Pennsylvania shield statute
provides:
No person engaged on, connected with, or employed by any newspaper of general
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Circuit interpreted in Riley v. City of Chester.3 5 The court strongly
emphasized the importance of freedom of the press, but stated that
there existed countervailing interests sufficient to overcome the
newsgatherer's privilege to refuse to reveal the source of his
information.3 6 In interpreting the Pennsylvania statute the court
adopted a balancing approach.3 7 The court emphasized that the
information sought must not be available from any other source
and must go to the heart of the issue. 3 s If a party could show these
factors, his right to force disclosure would take precedence over the
39
newsgatherer's privilege.
Following Branzburg, courts have shown great deference to
statutorily enacted shield laws. 40 Courts generally hold that this
area is within the province of the legislature, and the judicial
branch should respect the legislature's determination of public
41
policy.
circulation or any press association or any radio or television station, or any magazine
of general circulation, for the purpose of gathering, procuring, compiling, editing or
publishing news, shall be required to disclose the source of any information procured
or obtained by such person, in any legal proceeding, trial or investigation before any
government unit.
Id.
35. 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979). The Riley case was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 5 1343 and 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 710 (3d Cir. 1979). See 28 U.S.C. § 1343
(1976); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Riley was a policeman working for the city of Chester,
Pennsylvania. He claimed that the defendant city violated his constitutional right to conduct his
campaign for mayor. He complained that employees of the city prejudiced his campaign by personal
surveillance, investigating his performance as a police officer, and then leaking this information to
the press. 612 F.2d at 710.
36. 612 F.2d at 715. The court stated that it would examine each situation on a case by case
basis. It adopted the position put forward byJustice Powell in Branzburg, that courts should weigh the
factors involved in each case to determine the proper balance between freedom of the press and the
duty of all citizens to give whatever information they possess at trial. Id. at 716 (citing Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell,J., concurring)).
37. Riley, 612 F.2d at 716.
38. Id. at 717.
39. Id. The Riley court approved oflanguage used by other courts, such as the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. Id. at 716-17 (referring to Silkwood v. KerrMcGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977)). The Silkwood court considered four criteria in
balancing the interests involved: "(1) Whether the party seeking information has independently
attempted to obtain the information elsewhere and has been unsuccessful. (2) Whether the
information goes to the heart of the matter. (3) Whether the information is of certain relevance. (4)
The type of controversy." Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 438 (10th Cir. 1977).
40. 612 F.2d at 715. The Riley court recognized that a strong public policy element in
Pennsylvania supported the protection of newsmen and newsgatherers. The ultimate beneficiary of
this strong public policy would be the public at large. Id.
41. E.g., State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 30 A.2d 421 (1943). The New Jersey Supreme
Court upheld the state's shield statute. The court reasoned that the shield statute could not be
contrary to public policy because the legislature, whose function was to determine public policy, had
passed this legislation. Id. at __, 30 A.2d at 426. Although the Donovan decision occurred prior to
Branzburg, the Branzburg Court used language similar to Donovan when the Court justified its
invitation to the state legislature to pass newsgatherer protection legislation if it deemed it necessary.
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706.
But see Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1971) (shield
statute unconstitutional as applied to reporter who violated court order compelling disclosure), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972); Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d
1354 (1976) (declaring New Mexico's shield statute unconstitutional), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906
(1978). In Ammerman the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the shield statute was actually a rule
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Prior to reaching the primary issue in Grand Forks Herald, the
North Dakota Supreme Court addressed whether it should exercise
its original jurisdiction. 42 The North Dakota Constitution
specifically provides that the supreme court shall have appellate
and original jurisdiction and the authority to issue such original
and remedial writs as may be necessary. 4 3 In Spence v. North Dakota
District Court44 the supreme court stated that its authority to issue
original writs was discretionary, and the party seeking its issuance
could not assert it as a matter of right.4 5 The court also stated that it
will decide for itself, on an ad hoc basis, whether to invoke its
original jurisdiction. 6 Another restraining factor on the usage of
original jurisdiction is that the rights of the public must be directly
affected. 47 The court has explained the instances in which it will
exercise this discretionary power and issue a supervisory writ to the
court below. 48 In Ingalls v. Bakken49 the court stated that the action
of evidence. In holding the statute unconstitutional, the court reasoned that it was the province of the
courts, rather than that of the legislature, to promulgate rules of evidence. Id. at -, 551 P.2d at
1359. See also Annot., 99 A.L.R. 3D 88-89 (1980) (discussing constitutionality of shield statutes).
Although the North Dakota Supreme Court did not pass judgment on this issue in the Grand
Forks Herald case, it recognized the issue and held in reserve the entire issue of whether the state
legislature had exceeded its authority in passing such legislation. GrandForks Herald, 322 N.W.2d at
853 n.3. The court stated:
Because it was not raised as an issue, we do not decide the authority of the Legislature,
as opposed to the authority of this Court, to regulate the admission of evidence in a
judicial proceeding. Section 3 of Article VI of the North Dakota Constitution grants to
the Supreme Court the authority "to promulgate rules of procedure, including
appellate procedure, to be followed by all the courts of this state; . . .- Many of the
same privileges found in Chapter 31-01, N.D.C.C., are found in Article V,
N.D.R.Ev. The substance of Section 31-01-06.2 is not found in any of the North
Dakota Rules of Evidence. However, Rule 501 thereof provides: "Except as otherwise
provided by constitution or statute or by these or other rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court of this State, no person has a privilege" to refuse to be a witness,
refuse to disclose any matter, etc.
Id.
42. 322 N.W.2d at 852. Since the petitioner requested the court to issue a supervisory writ
vacating the order of the district court, the court first addressed whether it had jurisdiction to issue
such a writ. Id.
43. N.D. CoNsr. art. VI, § 2. This section provides in part: "The supreme court shall be the
highest court in the state. It shall have appellate jurisdiction, and shall also have original jurisdiction
with authority to issue, hear, and determine such original and remedial writs as may be necessary to
properly exercise its jurisdiction." Id.
44. 292 N.W.2d 53 (N.D. 1980). In Spence the petitioners asked the court to invoke its original
jurisdiction and issue a supervisory writ directing the lower court to compel answers to certain
interrogatories. The court held that this involved a private or personal interest, as opposed to an
important public interest, and that petitioners had not exhausted other remedies available to them.
Thus, the court declined to issue the writ. Spence v. North Dakota Dist. Court, 292 N.W.2d 53, 57
(N.D. 1980).
45. Id.
46. Id. Because each case depends on the specific facts involved, the court said that it would have
to weigh the facts on a case by case basis. Id.
47. Id. The Spence court reasoned that the sovereignty of the state or the liberties of the people
must be at issue, and the court cannot invoke jurisdiction to vindicate mere private interests. Thus,
only when a matter of public concern is at issue will the court exercise its original jurisdiction. In
addition, the court stated that the state interest must be of primary importance and not merely
tangential. Id.
48. Id.
49. 167 N.W.2d 516 (N.D. 1969).
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of the trial court that is complained of must result in "grave or
serious prejudice" before the court will exercise its discretionary
power to issue a supervisory writ. 50 Also, the party seeking this
extraordinary remedy must have no other adequate remedy
available to him, or the court will deny the application for the
51
writ.
In deciding to exercise its discretionary power and invoke its
original jurisdiction in GrandForks Herald, the court considered four
factors. 5 2 These factors were the involvement of a strong public
interest, a challenge to the first amendment guarantee of freedom
of the press, the adjudication of an issue of first impression in North
53
Dakota, and the nonappealability of the district court order.
Once invoking its original jurisdiction, the court next addressed
54
the primary issue; whether North Dakota's shield statute
protected the Grand Forks Herald from having to surrender its
photographs. 5 5 In arguing that the statutory protection did not
extend to the Grand Forks Herald, the respondent reasoned that
the statute only applied to confidential sources.5 6 The court,
however, maintained that the statute applied not only to
confidential sources, but to all sources and any information
obtained by the newsgatherer. 57 The court stated, nevertheless,
that the confidentiality of the information or its source was a factor
that the district court may consider in determining whether
nondisclosure would lead to a miscarriage of justice. 58 The court
50. Ingalls v. Bakken, 167 N.W.2d 516, 518 (N.D. 1969) (procedural case in which the court
discussed the instances in which it would issue supervisory writs).
51. Id.
52. 322 N.W.2d at 852.
53. Id. Since the discovery proceeding is interlocutory, the district court order is not appealable.
Id. In addition, the Grand Forks Herald would not have had standing to appeal a final adjudication
of the underlying case because it was not a party to that action. Thus, the only method by which the
court could hear the newspaper's argument would be through a grant of original jurisdiction. Id.
54. For the text of the North Dakota shield statute, see supra note 12.
55. 322 N.W.2d at 853-56.
56. Id. at 854. In any event the court expressly found that the photographs of a public street, one
ofwhich the newspaper later published, were not confidential. Id. at 856.
At least one jurisdiction, however, has applied a confidential source requirement. See Andrews
v. Andreoli, 92 Misc. 2d 410,
-, 400 N.Y.S.2d 442, 447 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (information must be
confidential before a reporter can withhold the information from a special grand jury proceeding);
People v. DuPree, 88 Misc. 2d 791,
, 388 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (photographs of
a murder scene taken by a newspaper photographer were not confidential and, thus, not protected by
the state's shield law).
The North Dakota Supreme Court could find nothing ambiguous in the shield statute. Thus, it
interpreted the statute literally. 322 N.W.2d at 854. In a concurring opinionjustice Pederson stated
that the statute was ambiguous. He said that "[t]he legislature should either require an in camera
disclosure whenever the shield is claimed, or eliminate the requirement that the judge make a
finding." Id. at 858 (Pederson, J., concurring).
57. 322 N.W.2d at 854.
58. Id. The parties agreed that abuse of discretion is the proper standard for the shield statute.
Id. Using this standard, the court stated "that a trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner," and that "an abuse of discretion by the trial
court is never assumed but must be affirmatively established." Id.
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indicated that the statute applied to all proceedings whether civil or
criminal. 59 The court, however, included the type of proceeding as
another factor that the judge may consider when balancing the
0
interests involved. 6
The Grand Forks Herald contended that the respondent must
exhaust all other possible sources of information before the court
61
could force it to release information pursuant to the shield statute.
Scrutinizing the legislative intent and the final wording of the
statute, the court found that the statute imposed only the
requirement that the newsgatherer release information if the failure
to disclose would result in a miscarriage ofjustice. 62 Thus, the courtexpressly found that to force disclosure the respondent need not
have exhausted all other possible sources of information. 63 Even
though North Dakota's shield law does not include the "no other
source" requirement, the district court may weigh this factor in
determining whether to force disclosure. 64 If there are other sources
available to the party seeking disclosure, it is unlikely that the
district court would force disclosure. 65 Another factor that the
district court should consider is the factual situation peculiar to the
case. 66 In light of these criteria, the court said that its decision
59. Id. at 854. But see Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975). The Loadholtz
court, in a civil proceeding, held that to require a reporter to divulge documents assembled in the
course of employment as a reporter would violate the first and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution. Id. at 1301.
60. 322 N.W.2d at 854-55.
61. Id. at 855.
62. Id. The original version of the shield legislation stated that the district court could require
disclosure only if it expressly found the following:
1.

2.

The existence of probable cause to believe that the respondent or his source has
evidence which is relevant and material to an issue of proper concern to the
petitioner, and
Disclosure by the respondent is the only method by which such evidence, or
evidence of similar effect, can be obtained;...

S. 2077, 43d N.D. Leg. Sess. (1973). The legislature later deleted this language from the bill.
JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, 43d N.D. Leg. Sess. 560 (1973).
63. 322 N.W.2d at 855. It seems that many decisions require the party seeking disclosure to
exhaust all possible alternative sources or show a compelling interest. See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656
F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (appellants must show that they have exhausted other possible sources of
information); Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (plaintiff must show a
compelling interest or at least that the information is not available from any other source).
64. 322 N.W.2d at 855.
65. Id. The newspaper argued that Leng had not exhausted all the alternative sources of
information available to her. The court recognized that the photographs would provide much better
evidence than the faulty memories of the human participants. Since Leng established that no other
photographs of the accident scene existed, the court concluded that she carried her burden and made
an adequate showing that the newspaper should release the photographs. Id. at 855-56.
Justice Sand disagreed with this finding of the court. He reasoned that the statute protected only
information or sources of information, not photographs taken of an accident scene. If the statute
would have applied to the photographs, however, the Grand Forks Herald would not have to release
them because the respondent did not carry her burden of showing that failure to grant access to the
photographs would result in a miscarriage ofjustice. Id. at 859 (Sand, J., concurring specially and
dissenting).
66. Id. at 857. The Grand Forks Herald feared that precedent would lead attorneys on discovery
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would not chill first amendment rights in the State of North
Dakota .67
This decision does not destroy first amendment freedom of the
press in North Dakota. Rather, it is a careful balance between this
important freedom and the fair and uniform administration of
justice. Newsmen are not above the law and must comply with the
rule that the courts are entitled to every man's evidence. 68 This is
essential if the courts are to carry out their function of
administering justice. The Grand Forks Herald decision should
reassure the press that there will be no wholesale forced disclosures
or probing into issues that are not relevant to the case. 69 In this
initial interpretation of North Dakota's shield statute, the court laid
down specific parameters to guide the district courts. Factors the
district court may consider include the confidential nature of the
information, the type of proceedings involved, and the availability
of the information from other sources. 70 Above all, the
determinative factor will be the specific factual situation in each
case. 71
JEFFREY N.
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excursions through their files. Id. The court, however stated:
Our decision cannot be construed, as the Herald apparently fears, as a precedent
which will permit fishing expeditions into a newsgatherer's files nor as a precedent
which will permit a newsgather to be required to submit to discovery procedures in a
case in which the newsperson is not a party, in the remote possibility that the person
may have some information which would be beneficial to a party in a legal action.
Id.
67. Id.
68. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 70 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Wigmore states:
For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim
that the public (in the words sanctioned by Lord Hardwicke) has a right to everyman's
evidence. When we come to examine the various claims of exemption, we start with
the primary assumption that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is
capable of giving and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional,
being so many derogations from a positive general rule.
Id.
69. 322 N.W.2d at 857.
70. Id. at 854-55.
71. Id. at 857.
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ADDENDUM
In the interim period between the North Dakota Supreme
Court's decision in St. Paul Mercury Insurance C. v. Andrews, 321
N.W.2d 483 (N.D. 1982), and the printing of the following Case
Comment, the 48th Legislative Assembly addressed the insurance
stacking issues presented in Andrews. The Assembly passed House
Bill 1195, which created a new section to chapter 26-41 of the North
Dakota Century Code. House Bill 1195 also amended and
reenacted section 26-05-42 of the North Dakota Century Code,
which addresses uninsured motorist coverage. House Bill 1195
prohibits stacking of uninsured motorist coverages and no-fault
benefits within North Dakota. The legislative action thus modifies
the holding of Andrews and reverses that part of the decision that
allowed stacking of uninsured motorist coverages.

